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TORT LAW—THE SUDDEN MEDICAL EMERGENCY
DEFENSE IN CONNECTICUT1: INSURERS BENEFIT WHILE
THE INNOCENT INSURED IS LEFT TO SUFFER
Caitrin Ellen Kiley
Every individual in the United States who purchases and registers a
vehicle is involved with the automobile insurance industry. Like many
other types of insurance, there is much longstanding debate regarding
the difficulty associated with receiving the benefits one has paid for.
This debate is particularly complicated in Connecticut. Unlike many
other jurisdictions that have a no-fault automobile insurance system,
Connecticut relies on a tort-based liability system for determining
compensation for an injured party.
In Connecticut, when a driver or passenger is injured in a car accident
as a result of the actions of another driver, damages are recovered by
proving legal liability. Connecticut courts currently allow a
defendant and their insurer to escape liability if the defendant driver
caused the accident due to a “medical emergency.” When a defendant
proves that they suffered a “medical emergency,” the plaintiff is also
barred from recovering underinsured or uninsured motorist coverage
under their own insurance policy. The injured person is left with the
financial burden, despite the fact that both parties were covered by
insurance.
This Note argues that Connecticut should, either through legislation
or regulation, disallow automobile insurance companies from taking
advantage of the Sudden Medical Emergency Defense as a way to
1. Bushnell v. Bushnell, 131 A. 432 (Conn. 1925). The “Sudden Medical Emergency”
defense goes by many different names, such as “Sudden Incapacitation Defense,” a “Blackout
Defense”, and an “Act of God Defense.” Goodrich v. Blair, 646 P.2d 890, 892 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1982); Rogers v. Wilhelm-Olsen, 748 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Ky. Ct. App.1988); Eatmon v. Weeks,
746 S.E.2d 886, 889 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). For purposes of uniformity, this Note will refer to
the defense as “Sudden Medical Emergency” throughout.
78
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deny providing coverage after an automobile accident. This would
allow a plaintiff who was injured due to the incapacitation caused by
a sudden medical emergency of another driver to recover from the
other driver’s insurance company, up to their policy limits, and from
their own insurance company if uninsured or underinsured motorist
coverage applies.

INTRODUCTION
It seems like a simple case: you are driving down the road, abiding
by all traffic laws, when suddenly a car traveling in the opposite direction
crosses the double yellow lines and collides with you head-on.2 You are
left with serious injuries that have rendered you unable to work, with
exorbitant medical bills, and with a totaled car. Since the other driver
crossed the double lines, which was in violation of a state statute, your
attorney tells you that you have a prima facie case of negligence.3 After
collecting your medical and property damage bills, your attorney sends a
demand package4 to the defendant driver’s insurer, expecting a prompt
settlement.5 Instead of offering a settlement, the insurer responds by
denying coverage, claiming that their insured suffered from an
unforeseeable physical incapacity.6
Your attorney informs you that if the other driver did suffer from an
unforeseeable physical incapacity, which caused him to cross the double
yellow lines, you will likely be unable to bring a flegal claim to collect
your damages from the driver. This is because of the legal defense known
as a Sudden Medical Emergency and its effect: “as between an innocent
injured party and an innocent ill driver, the innocent injured party must
suffer.”7 While both the ill driver and the innocent injured party have
automobile insurance, the innocent injured party still “must suffer.”8 Even
2. See generally David M. Kopstein, Defeat the ‘Sudden Medical Emergency’ Defense
24 AM. ASS’N FOR JUST. (2009).
3. Zeni v. Anderson, 243 N.W.2d 270, 276 (Mich. 1976). Prima facie means “[s]uch
evidence as . . . is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts . . . and which
if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.” Kruzich v. Martin–Harris Gallery, 126
P.3d 867, 874 (Wyo. 2006) (emphasis omitted). Generally, the violation of a standard set by a
statute or ordinance is prima facie evidence of negligence. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 288A (1965). See Pietrycka v. Simolan, 120 A. 310, 312 (Conn. 1923).
4. A “demand package” is prepared by an attorney during the pre-litigation phase of a
personal injury claim process. Richard P. Console Jr., What Is a Demand Package, HG.ORG
LEGAL RES., https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/what-is-a-demand-package-34473 (last visited
Mar. 25, 2020). The “package” is created after collecting “medical bills and documents that
illustrate your injuries and wage loss.” Id. This begins the negotiation process between your
attorney and the insurance companies. Id.
5. Kopstein, supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. Bashi v. Wodarz, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 635, 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
8. See id.
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though the insurance company is not denying that their insured caused the
accident, in Connecticut’s tort-based system, the insurance company will
be able to take the benefit of the Sudden Medical Emergency Defense, and
deny liability and coverage.9
Part I of this Note will discuss the application of the Sudden Medical
Emergency Defense, the different jurisdictional approaches to this
defense, and both the validations and criticisms of the defense. Part II of
this Note will provide a general background of automobile insurance law
in the United States, with a specific focus on Connecticut’s automobile
insurance law. Part II will also discuss how public policy has shaped
Automobile Insurance Law, and how the automobile insurance industry is
often paradoxical. After considering public policy, Part III will then argue
that Connecticut, either through legislation or regulation, should disallow
automobile insurance companies from escaping the responsibility of
coverage solely because an incapacitated driver caused the automobile
accident.
I.

THE HISTORY AND USE OF THE SUDDEN MEDICAL EMERGENCY
DEFENSE IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT LIABILITY CASES
In automobile accidents, the cause of action is often negligence.10
The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well
established: the defendant must owe a duty to the plaintiff, the defendant
must have breached that duty, and the breach must have caused actual
injuries to the plaintiff.11 When driving, all drivers have a duty to drive
with reasonable care under the circumstances.12 In considering liability
and negligence, the defendant may assert an affirmative legal defense.13
An affirmative defense is pleaded with the purpose of defeating or
avoiding a plaintiff’s cause of action.14 It “alleges that even if [the]
plaintiff’s petition is true, [the] plaintiff cannot prevail because there are

9. See, e.g., Miller v. Porter, 242 A.2d 744 (Conn. 1968); Pareles v. McCarthy, 178 A.2d
155 (Conn. 1962); Gilgrados v. State, No. HHDCV136042521, 2016 WL 1266040 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 2016).
10. What Is Car Accident Law?, HG.ORG LEGAL RES., https://www.hg.org/caraccident.html [https://perma.cc/3U55-G4AQ].
11. See Grenier v. Comm’r Transportation, 51 A.3d 367, 379 (Conn. 2012).
12. See generally Hesse v. McClintic, 176 P.3d 759, 762 (Colo. 2008). Since automobile
statutes are created with the purpose of safety in mind, drivers also have a duty to obey all traffic
laws and statutes. Id.
13. Travis
Peeler,
Auto
Accident
Defenses,
LEGAL
MATCH,
https://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/auto-accident-defenses.html
[https://perma.cc/X7MS-WTH4]. See Delott v. Roraback, 426 A.2d 791, 795 (Conn. 1980).
14. CONN. PRACTICE BOOK Sec.10–50 (1998); Wilmes v. Consumers Oil Co. of
Maryville, 473 S.W.3d 705, 716 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (citing City of Peculiar v. Effertz Bros.
Inc., 254 S.W.3d 51, 59 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)).
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additional facts that permit the defendant to avoid legal responsibility.”15
A. What Is the Sudden Medical Emergency Defense?
Most jurisdictions treat a sudden medical emergency as a complete
defense to negligence in automobile accidents.16 In order to successfully
plead this defense, a defendant must demonstrate that they became
incapacitated, that the ensuing accident was a result of the incapacitation,
and that the incapacitation was not reasonably foreseeable.17 “To fall
within the scope of this defense, a defendant’s alleged incapacity need not
include unconsciousness, as long as the incapacity is severe enough to
render the defendant suddenly incapable of controlling a motor vehicle.”18
A common example of when this defense is used is when a defendant
driver has a heart attack and loses control of their vehicle, causing an
accident.19
There are certain factual situations that will bar a defendant from
using the Sudden Medical Emergency Defense. For example, if the
defendant is on notice of facts that would be sufficient to cause a
reasonable person to anticipate that her driving might injure another, the
defense is unavailable.20 The defense is also unavailable if, right before
the incapacitation occurred, the incapacitated driver was violating a
statutory duty, such as the duty to refrain from driving while intoxicated,21
or the duty to drive within the posted speed limit.22
15. Id.
16. A complete defense completely bars a plaintiff from recovering from a defendant,
unlike some defenses that act only as a partial bar resulting in a percentage deduction from
otherwise recoverable damages. JOHN L. DIAMOND ET. AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 228 (5th
ed. 2013). Rogers v. Wilhelm-Olsen, 748 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988). See also
Lutzkovitz v. Murray, 339 A.2d 64, 66 (Del. 1975) (holding that if a driver unexplainably
blacked-out prior to an accident and the accident was therefore unavoidable, culpability could
not be contributed to that driver). See, e.g., MICHAEL P. THOMAS ET AL., CAL. CIV. PRAC.
TORTS § 25:87 SUDDEN ILLNESS OR DISABILITY, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2020).
17. Rogers, 748 S.W.2d at 673; Miller v. Porter, 242 A.2d 744 (Conn. 1968); Pareles v.
McCarthy, 178 A.2d 155 (Conn. 1962); see also Lutzkovitz v. Murray, 339 A.2d 64, 66 (Del.
1975) (holding that if a driver unexplainably blacked-out prior to an accident and the accident
was therefore unavoidable, culpability could not be contributed to that drive). See e.g., SUDDEN
ILLNESS OR DISABILITY, CAL. CIV. PRAC. TORTS § 25:87 (updated Nov. 2020).
18. KOPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 24 (citing Word v. Jones ex rel. Moore, 516 S.E.2d 144,
147–48 (N.C. 1999)).
19. Roman v. Estate of Gobbo, 791 N.E.2d 422, 423–24 (Ohio 2003).
20. Rogers, 748 S.W.2d at 673. For example, if a driver suffers from a hypoglycemiainduced seizure and causes an accident, but he was previously diagnosed with diabetes and was
not taking his medication, the Sudden Medical Emergency Defense will not be available to him.
See generally Ghaffar v. Foster, 170 A.D.3d 674 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019).
21. Lehman v. Haynam, 133 N.E.2d 97, 101 (Ohio 1956).
22. Rogers, 748 S.W.2d at 673. If a defendant was negligent before the sudden medical
emergency in question occurred, they will still be legally liable for causing the accident. Id.
“While a driver may not be negligent after the emergency arose, the driver may be liable for
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B. Applying the Defense During Trial
Throughout a trial in which a defendant is asserting a Sudden Medical
Emergency Defense, there will be facts presented by both sides regarding
whether a “sudden medical emergency” actually occurred.23 The factual
considerations relate to whether the driver was incapacitated, whether the
incapacitation was the proximate cause of the accident, and whether the
incapacitation was foreseeable.24 This is unlike other automobile cases,
where the main factual consideration is whether a defendant driver was
driving unreasonably.25
During a trial that involves liability stemming from an automobile
accident, “the jurors are triers of fact, but the court, not the jury, is the
judge of the law.”26 This means that before deliberating on the facts of
the case to determine a verdict, the jurors are instructed by the court as to
the law that they must apply.27 Connecticut has a jury instruction specific
to a Sudden Emergency, which is drafted from the standpoint of the
defendant.28
negligence or tortious actions which caused the emergency.” Vanessa L. Anderson, Collision
of Negligence Theory: Does A “Blackout” Constitute an Unavoidable, Sudden Emergency in
North Dakota?, 87 N.D. L. REV. 233, 243 (2011).
23. See MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C., SUDDEN MEDICAL EMERGENCIES
WHILE
DRIVING
IN
ALL
50
STATES
13,
https://www.mwl-law.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/SUDDEN-MEDICAL-EMERGENCIES-WHILE-DRIVINGCHART.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK38-2MCN].
24. Rogers, 748 S.W.2d at 673. See also Lutzkovitz v. Murray, 339 A.2d 64, 66 (Del.
1975). See, e.g., Miller v. Porter, 242 A.2d 744 (Conn. 1968); Pareles v. McCarthy, 178 A.2d
155 (Conn. 1962); Gilgrados v. State, No. HHDCV136042521, 2016 WL 1266040 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 2016).
25. David Goguen, Car Accident Injury Cases: The Basics, ALL LAW,
https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/auto-accident/car-accident-case-basics.html
[https://perma.cc/4JJ2-6ET7].
26. § 24:22 Jury instructions, 2 TENN. CIR. CT. PRAC. (Dec. 2018).
27. Id.
28. The Jury Instruction reads:
As previously stated, negligence is the failure to exercise reasonable care under all
of the circumstances presented. One of the circumstances for you to consider in
this case is whether a sudden emergency situation existed. The existence of a
sudden emergency is a factor to be considered in the evaluation of whether the
defendant acted as a reasonable person under the circumstances. An individual,
choosing a course of action in an emergency, is required to exercise the care of an
ordinarily prudent person acting in such an emergency.
You are to consider the evidence in this case to determine whether an emergency
situation existed. If you find that an emergency existed which was not caused by
the conduct of the defendant and that, as a result of the emergency, the defendant
chose a course of action which a reasonable person would have done under the
circumstances, then the defendant’s conduct would not be negligent. However, if
you find that plaintiff’s injuries resulted from the conduct of the defendant and that
either an emergency did not exist, or the emergency situation was caused by the
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Generally, a plaintiff “is entitled to an instruction on the sudden[]
emergency doctrine when there is evidence that would permit the jury to
conclude that an emergency existed within the rule, but not where the
evidence introduced fails to establish one of the elements necessary to
invoke the sudden[] emergency doctrine.”29 While providing the Sudden
Medical Emergency Defense is a practice that has been upheld by many
jurisdictions,
appellate courts frequently instruct that the better practice is ordinarily
not to give a sudden emergency instruction, because despite the basic
logic and simplicity of the sudden emergency doctrine, it is all too
frequently misapplied on the facts or misstated in jury instructions,
and the risk of prejudicial error in instructing the jury on the suddenemergency doctrine exceeds by far the possibility of error in not doing
so.30

While the jury instruction for considering a Sudden Medical
Emergency Defense is still granted in some trials, the practice of giving
this instruction has become “increasingly criticized as being confusing
and misleading.”31 In instances where the jury instruction is not given,
jurors are only considering the facts and determining if the defendant
acted unreasonably under the circumstances.32
C. Acceptance and Use of the Defense in American Jurisdictions
“[C]ases decided under negligence theories have uniformly held that

defendant’s own conduct, or that the defendant, in the face of an emergency, failed
to act as a reasonable person would have done under the circumstances, then the
defendant would be negligent.
CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION COMM., CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL BRANCH CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS 3.7-18 (Revised Jan. 1, 2008), https://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/Civil/Civil.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9P6C-QC8Y].
29. Daly v. McFarland, 812 N.W.2d 113, 115 (Minn. 2012) (holding that when given, a
jury instruction on the emergency rule requires a jury to consider the fact of sudden peril as a
circumstance in determining the reasonableness of a person’s response thereto); Pelletier v.
Lahm, 111 A.D.3d 807, 809 (N.Y.S.2d 2013) (holding a jury instruction on the emergency
doctrine is warranted when the evidence supports a finding that the party requesting the charge
was confronted by a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for
thought, deliberation, or consideration); LAURA H. DIETZ ET AL., 57A AM. JUR. 2D
NEGLIGENCE § 214 JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Westlaw (database updated May 2020).
30. Laura Hunter Dietz, Negligence § 214, 57 A. AM. JUR. 2D (Nov. 2019).
31. Id.
32. Negligence generally means that someone failed to behave with the level of care
someone with “ordinary prudence” would have acted with under the same circumstances.
Negligence,
CORNELL
LAW
SCHOOL
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/negligence (last visited Mar. 27, 2020). If there are no jury
instructions, the jury is normally just considering whether there was a duty, and whether the
parties acted reasonably under the circumstance. See id.
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a sudden loss of consciousness while driving is a complete defense to an
action based on negligence or gross negligence, if such loss of
consciousness was not foreseeable.”33 The rationale behind the defense is
that a driver who cannot weigh and consider the best means to avoid
impending danger should not be held to the same standard of control, care,
and caution as someone who can fully exercise judgment and reason.34
In most jurisdictions where the defense is available, the sudden
emergency doctrine is given as a jury instruction.35 In such a jurisdiction,
the jury is tasked with determining whether the defendant driver was
confronted with a sudden emergency and has proven all the elements of
the defense.36 If the jury determines that a sudden emergency occurred,
the jury is then tasked with finding whether the driver acted reasonably
under the circumstances.37 If they find that the defense applied and the
defendant acted reasonably, no liability is imposed.38
D. Criticism and Abandonment of the Defense in American
Jurisdictions
Most jurisdictions have the defense39 and have had cases that have
addressed its use.40 Numerous jurisdictions, however, have abolished or
heavily restricted the sudden emergency doctrine.41 For example, in 2013,
33. Roman v. Estate of Gobbo, 791 N.E.2d 422, 428 (Ohio 2003).
34. This is the rationale used to discuss the “Sudden Emergency Defense.” Manno v.
Gutierrez, 934 So. 2d 112, 117 (La. Ct. App. 2006). A sudden emergency has the same elements
as a “sudden medical emergency,” but the “emergency” is not a medical event. See id. An
example of a sudden emergency is a deer jumping out in front a driver’s car.
The rationale for the doctrine is the principle that a person confronted with a
sudden emergency, who does not have sufficient time to weigh and consider the
best means to avoid an impending danger, should not be held to the same standard
of control, care, and caution as someone who has ample opportunity to fully
exercise judgment and reason.
Id.
35. Anderson, supra note 22, at 243.
36. Id. at 242–43.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Carol DiBari, Car Accidents Caused by a Medical Emergency, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/car-accidents-caused-medical-emergency.html
[https://perma.cc/ZEV2-S7TB].
40. Id. (citing Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Modern Status of Sudden Emergency
Doctrine, 10 A.L.R. 5th 680, 687 (1993 & Supp. 2010) (citing cases from Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming)).
41. See Lyons v. Midnight Sun Transp. Servs. Inc., 928 P.2d 1202, 1206 (Alaska 1996)
(holding that sudden emergency instruction should rarely, if ever, be used); DiCenzo v. Izawa,
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the Colorado Supreme Court departed from the principle of stare decisis,42
effectively abandoning the law established by earlier cases and abolishing
the Sudden Emergency Defense.43 The rationale of the Colorado court,
like many others, was that the minimal utility for the defense in a
comparative negligence jurisdiction44 is greatly outweighed by the
potential danger of the instructions misleading the jury.45 This risk is
present because instead of weighing the incapacitation as a factor in the
overall consideration of reasonableness under the circumstances, the jury
may believe that the defendant does not have any burden of proof beyond
establishing that a medical event occurred.46
Even in states that have upheld the Sudden Medical Emergency
Defense,47 there have been justices that have disagreed and believe that
the defense goes against public policy, because it results in an innocent
plaintiff being the sole party bearing the damages caused by another’s
medical emergency.48 In 2003, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the
Sudden Medical Emergency Defense.49 The majority made its decision
based on precedent, stating that “the cases decided under negligence
723 P.2d 171, 181 (Haw. 1986) (strongly discouraging use of sudden emergency instruction);
Simonson v. White, 713 P.2d 983, 989–90 (Mont. 1986) (abolishing sudden emergency
instruction in automobile accident cases); Bjorndal v. Weitman, 184 P.3d 1115, 1121 (Or. 2008)
(abolishing sudden emergency instruction in automobile accident cases). See, e.g., Wiles v.
Webb, 946 S.W.2d 685, 689 (Ark. 1997); McClymont v. Morgan, 470 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Neb.
1991); Dunleavy v. Miller, 862 P.2d 1212, 1216–19 (N.M. 1993).
42. Stare decisis is a “doctrine that a court should not overrule its earlier decisions unless
the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic require it[.]” JANET P. BROOKS, 15 CONN. PRAC.,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT § 3:13, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2019).
43. Bedor v. Johnson, 292 P.3d 924, 928–29 (Colo. 2013).
44. In all but four states and the District of Columbia, contributory negligence has been
replaced by some form of comparative negligence.
JOHN L. DIAMOND ET. AL.,
UNDERSTANDING TORTS 232 (5th ed. 2013).
Under comparative negligence, “the conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls
below the standard of conduct which he should conform to for his own protection
and which is a legally contributing cause cooperating with the negligence of the
defendant in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm is only a partial bar to the
plaintiff’s recovery.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Third Restatement of Torts endorses the use of
comparative negligence. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: EFFECT OF PLAINTIFF’S
NEGLIGENCE WHEN PLAINTIFF SUFFERS AN INDIVISIBLE INJURY § 7 (2000).
45. Bedor v. Johnson, 292 P.3d 924, 929 (Colo. 2013).
46. See id.
47. Fourty-four states have some form of the sudden medical emergency defense, but
there are many different names and approaches to the defense. Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii,
Kansas, and Utah do not have the defense, and Idaho discourages its use. MATTHIESEN, supra
note 23, at 3.
48. See Roman v. Estate of Gobbo, 791 N.E.2d 422, 433–34 (Ohio 2003) (Pfeifer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Young v. Clark, 814 P.2d 364, 369 (Colo.
1991), abrogated by Bedor v. Johnson, 292 P.3d 924 (Colo. 2013).
49. See Roman, 791 N.E.2d at 422.
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theories have uniformly held that a sudden loss of consciousness while
driving is a complete defense to an action based on negligence or gross
negligence, if such loss of consciousness was not foreseeable.”50 The
concurrence in part provided by Justice Pfeifer, however, disagreed with
the decision and proposed a new rule.51 While he agreed that having a
heart attack did not make the driver negligent, he argued that the doctrine
is not sensible because the innocent plaintiff bears the harsh consequences
by being unable to recover any damages from the defendant or through
uninsured motorist coverage.52 He recommended a “better rule” which
would “allow individuals . . . to pursue damages against a person whose
sudden medical emergency resulted in a statutory violation and was the
proximate cause of the death or injury.”53 This rule is “better” because it
recognizes and accommodates for the unfairness of the harsh
consequences of the sudden medical emergency h on an innocent
plaintiff.54
E. Connecticut’s Application of the Defense
The Connecticut Supreme Court has not considered the validity and
use of the Sudden Medical Emergency Defense since 1925.55 While the
law has not changed, there has been criticism regarding the confusion
associated with the doctrine, specifically with respect to the level of care
owed and its effect on the application of comparative negligence.56
There is currently a split among Connecticut Superior Courts
regarding how a Sudden Medical Emergency Defense should be pleaded,
in part because the Connecticut Practice Book does not specifically
address this issue.57 The majority rule is that a sudden emergency should
be pleaded as a general denial, leaving the burden of proof on the
50. Id. at 428.
51. See id. at 433–34 (Pfeifer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. Id. at 433.
53. Id. at 434. This Note does not suggest that this should be the new rule, as this
suggested rule would unfairly punish a driver who had a sudden medical event, such as a heart
attack. Rather than shifting the “suffering” from the plaintiff to the defendant, this Note
suggests that instead of the defendant bearing the total cost of damages, the defendant’s
insurance company should be responsible and pay up to the policy limits. By having insurance
companies be liable up to policy limits, an injured plaintiff will also be able to collect
underinsured or uninsured coverage from their own insurer if such coverage is applicable.
54. See generally id.
55. MATTHIESEN, supra note 23, at 3. See Caron v. Guiliano, 211 A.2d 705, 706 (Conn.
Supp. 1965) (“In an automobile negligence case, the jury determines the credibility of the
witnesses and decides whether or not the defendant was stricken suddenly by a fainting spell
and was thus unable to control his automobile.”). See generally Bushnell v. Bushnell, 131 A.
432 (Conn. 1925).
56. See supra Section I.D; Bushnell v. Bushnell, 131 A. 432 (Conn. 1925).
57. Carter v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co., No. FBTCV156051233S, 2017 WL
3011643, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2017); CONN. PRACTICE BOOK Sec.10-50 (1998).
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plaintiff.58 This means that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant did
not have a medical emergency, or that the medical emergency was
foreseeable.59 “It [is] difficult, if not impossible, for a plaintiff to prove a
defendant [was] conscious, and . . . to prove that if he were unconscious
[that] such condition was foreseeable, such as sleepiness or an intoxicated
condition[,] . . . ” yet this is the burden that is put on the plaintiff in the
majority of cases in Connecticut.60
The minority rule is that if the defendant wishes to allege a sudden
emergency, they may do so as a special defense, and assume the burden
of proof.61 This means that the defendant must prove that he suffered a
sudden medical emergency, and therefore should not be held to the normal
standard of care, and was not negligent.62 In reaching this conclusion, the
court reasoned that Connecticut has liberal rules of pleading based on
Section 10–50 of the Connecticut Practice Book, which are permissive,
not mandatory.63
While an automobile insurer has the legal duty to defend their insured
person,64 the jury is not aware of whether the defendant has any insurance,
or how much insurance they have.65 An insurance company has the
“[d]uty to indemnify the policyholder for any insurable damages arising
from a covered claim. If the insurance policy provides a duty to defend,
the insurance company must defend the policyholder in any lawsuit or
proceeding alleging a potentially covered claim.”66

58. Pinsker v. Fleming, No. CV010382908, 2002 WL 853632, at *1, 2 (Conn. 2002).
59. See id.
60. Lehmen v. Haynam, 133 N.E.2d 585, 590 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
61. Carter v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., No. FBTCV156051233S, 2017 WL 3011643, at *1,
2 (Conn. 2017).
62. See generally id.
63. Pinsker v. Fleming, No. CV010382908, 2002 WL 853632, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Apr. 12, 2002).
64. JANET KAMINSKI LEDUC, NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, OFFICE OF
LEGISLATIVE
RESEARCH
R-0255,
at
1
(Oct.
24,
2016),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/rpt/pdf/2016-R-0255.pdf [https://perma.cc/34KN-X34N]; CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38a-336-43 (West 2015).
65. Gigliotti v. United Illuminating Co., 193 A.2d 718,722–23 (Conn. 1963). The jury
instruction states that “[i]n the course of the trial there has been a passing reference to insurance.
There is no issue pertaining to insurance before you, and that reference to insurance should play
no part in your deliberations.” JUDGE SUPPORT SERVICES, CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL BRANCH
CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2.9-2 (Jan. 1, 2008), https://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/Civil/Civil.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9P6C-QC8Y] (citing Bryar v. Wilson, 204 A.2d 832, 832 (Conn. 1964)).
66. Elizabeth J. Stewart & Rachel Snow Kindseth, Insurance Bad Faith Litigation:
Connecticut Law Developments, 89 CONN. BAR J. 285, 286 (2016). “Most liability policies
provide not only for indemnity payments to the insured or to the beneficiary, but also require
that the company provide a defense for its insured in court, so long as the insured gives the
company timely notice of the inception or the threat of litigation.” § 49:105.Defense of Insured,
16 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 49:105 (4th ed. 2020).
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II. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
When an individual purchases and registers a motor vehicle, that
individual is required to purchase automobile insurance.67 “Automobile
insurance generally protects the insured, the insured’s property, and
damages sustained to the person and property of individuals as a result of
an accident involving the insured.”68 The personal automobile insurance
policy that an individual purchases can include up to five types of
coverage: liability coverage, medical coverage, collision coverage,
comprehensive coverage, and uninsured or underinsured motorist
coverage.69
Liability coverage in automobile insurance policies “indemnifies the
insured for the cost of bodily injury and property damage losses sustained
[by] a third party where the insured is determined to be at fault for the
accident.”70 Liability coverage, in general, is a “relatively recent
development.”71 Originally, liability policies were sold to manufacturers
and merchants to compensate them for general accidents and risk
liability.72 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, however,
liability insurance expanded into automobile liability policies, which
provided the policyholder with coverage of damages resulting from an
automobile accident.73 “Liability insurance expanded to other areas
gradually but took root as a form of commercial insurance protection in
the 1920s and 1930s.”74 Now, liability insurance is something that most
all of American drivers have.75 Virtually all states require this insurance,
and the public generally supports compulsory liability automobile
insurance so that there is financial security if someone negligently causes
a car accident.76
Medical coverage, which is also called “personal injury protection,”77

67. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-334 (West 2015); MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW
OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE 2 (2d ed. 2002). “All states require an individual who registers a car
to purchase automobile insurance.” Id.
68. JASPER, supra note 67, at 2–3.
69. Id. See also Thomas O. Farrish, “Diminished Value” In Automobile Insurance: The
Controversy and Its Lessons, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 39, 42–43 (2005).
70. JASPER, supra note 67, at 2–3.
71. RANDY MANILOFF & JEFFREY STEMPEL, GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
COVERAGE 2 (2d ed. 2012).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Background on: Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, INS. INFO. INST. (Aug. 11,
2020),
https://www.iii.org/article/background-on-compulsory-auto-uninsured-motorists
[https://perma.cc/3ACL-CPMT].
77. “Personal injury protection” (PIP) is a form of “first-party benefits.” Background on:
No-Fault
Auto
Insurance,
INS.
INFO.
INST.,
3
(Nov.
6,
2018),
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indemnifies the insured for medical expenses incurred by anyone who is
covered under the policy.78 Collision coverage, which usually is not
mandatory, compensates the insured for the cost of damage to a vehicle
arising out of impact from an automobile accident.79 Comprehensive
coverage, which is also not mandatory, compensates the insured for
damages to a vehicle that arise from something other than an accident,
such as vandalism, flooding, or fire.80
Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage is mandatory in some
states, including Connecticut.81
“Uninsured motorists coverage
compensates the insured for injuries sustained in accidents with
individuals who have no automobile insurance.”82 “Underinsured
motorists coverage permits the insured to increase liability payments for
personal injury and property damage they suffer where the other driver
has insufficient coverage.”83 The purpose of this coverage is to provide a
minimum level of available insurance for the protection of a person
injured at the hands of an uninsured or underinsured motorist.84
A. Automobile Insurance Law throughout the United States
In the United States, state automobile insurance laws fall into four
broad categories: tort liability, no-fault, choice-no fault, and add-on.85
The main difference between these categories is whether there are
restrictions on the “right to sue and whether the policyholder’s own
insurer pays first-party benefits, up to the state maximum amount,

https://www.iii.org/article/background-on-no-fault-auto-insurance
[https://perma.cc/3ACLCPMT]. First Party Benefits “covers medical expenses for the policyholder in case of an
accident. It also includes coverage for other drivers listed in the policy as well as relatives who
are living with the main policyholder.” Id.
78. Thomas O. Farrish, “Diminished Value” In Automobile Insurance: The Controversy
and Its Lessons, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 39, 42 (2005); JASPER, supra note 67, at 3. These “first
party” expenses may arise as a result of accidents involving the insured’s vehicle or accidents
involving other vehicles driven with the owner’s permission. Id.
79. See JASPER, supra note 67, at 4; Farrish, supra note 69, at 43.
80. Id.
81. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-336 (West 2015); see discussion infra Section
III.A.
82. JASPER, supra note 67, at 4.
83. Id. “Insufficient coverage” means the underinsured motorist has lower policy limits
than the insured. Id.
84. RICHARD L. NEWMAN & JEFFREY S. WILDSTEIN, TORT REMEDIES IN CONNECTICUT
§11-5 (2014) (“The purpose of such coverage is simply to provide an insured who is in an
accident with the same resources that he or she would have had if the tortfeasor had liability
insurance equal to the amount of the insured’s uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage.”).
See also Roy v. Centennial Ins. Co., 370 A.2d 1011 (Conn. 1976); American Universal Ins. Co.
v. DelGreco, 530 A.2d 171 (Conn. 1987).
85. Background on: No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 77.
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regardless of who is at fault in the accident.”86 Tort-based liability
insurance law was the standard in the United States before the introduction
of the no-fault system, which has been adopted in a number of states.87
Today, twenty-four states, and the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico,
have some form of no-fault insurance.88
1. Tort Liability Insurance Law
In states that use a traditional tort liability approach, “there are no
restrictions on lawsuits.”89 Accordingly, a policyholder that causes an
automobile accident “can be sued by the other driver and by the other
driver’s passengers for the pain and suffering the accident caused as well
as for out-of-pocket expenses such as medical costs.”90 In this tort-based
system, to recover damages, the injured party must prove that the other
party was responsible for causing the accident.91 “[T]he standard
automobile policy does not contain a definition of the terms ‘legal
liability’ or ‘legally obligated to pay’ and, instead, relies on ‘exclusions’
to preclude coverage in situations where the injured claimant is legally
barred from recovering damages from the tortfeasor operator or owner.”92
2. The New Systems of Insurance Law
In states that have adopted a no-fault system,93 insurance companies
86. Id.
87. JASPER, supra note 67, at 9; Background on: No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note
77. In the 1960s, the traditional tort liability system was criticized for being a time-consuming
and expensive process. Id. at 3. In the 1970s, numerous states introduced legislation which
would allow automobile accident victims to recover compensation from their losses from their
own insurance companies. Id.
88. Background on: No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 77.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. JASPER, supra note 67, at 9.
Under this tort-based system, an accident victim recovers damages for both
economic and non-economic damages from the party who was responsible for
causing the accident and recovers under the bodily injury protection coverage of
that party’s insurance policy. Such damages include economic lossese.g.,
property damages, medical expenses, lost wages; and non-economic
damagese.g. pain and suffering.
Id.
92. Irvin E. Schermer & William J. Schermer, Legal liability requirement—Scope of
requirement, 1 AUTO. LIABILITY INS. 4TH § 4A:1 (updated May 2020).
93.
“[N]o-fault automobile insurance” is often used to refer to automobile insurance
that permits a person to recover financial losses from his or her own insurance
company regardless of who caused the loss (i.e., no-fault first-party benefits or
personal injury protection). But this is an oversimplification. In the strictest sense,
a no-fault insurance program is one that both (1) provides payment of no-fault first
party benefits and (2) restricts the right to sue by establishing an injury severity
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compensate their own policy holders for the cost of injuries, regardless of
who was “at fault.”94 In strict “no-fault” jurisdictions, the term no-fault
applies only to states where insurance companies pay first-party
benefits,95 and where there are restrictions on the right to sue.96 This type
of compensation varies by state.97 Additionally, a no-fault system does
not mean there are no law suits regarding liability; rather, it means that an
injured driver may sue only for severe injuries.98
Some states, such as New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky,99 have
a “choice no-fault” insurance system.100 As the name suggests, when
signing up for an insurance policy, a driver has the option of purchasing a
no-fault auto insurance policy or a traditional tort liability policy.101 In
states that have an “add-on” system “drivers receive compensation from
their own insurance company as they do in no-fault states, but there are
no restrictions on lawsuits.”102
B. The Paradox of Automobile Insurance
“The basic premise of insurance is collective responsibility for harms
that befall individuals, because insurance pools people’s savings to pay
for individuals’ future losses.”103 By participating in insurance, a “riskpooling scheme,”104 an individual agrees to pay into a system that is not
only benefitting them, but also others, who may suffer a future loss, and

threshold that, if not met, prohibits a person from suing for damages.
JANET KAMINSKI LEDUC, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS IN CONNECTICUT,
OFFICE
OF
LEGISLATIVE
RESEARCH
R-0493
(Aug.
28,
2008),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-R-0493.htm [https://perma.cc/UX5D-PJHN].
94. Background on: No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 77.
95. JASPER, supra note 67, at 3 (“First party” expenses may arise as a result of accidents
involving the insured’s vehicle or accidents involving other vehicles driven with the owner’s
permission.).
96. Id.
97. Background on: No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 77. “In states with the most
comprehensive benefits, a policyholder receives compensation for medical fees, lost wages,
funeral costs and other out-of-pocket expenses. The major variations involve dollar limits on
medical and hospital expenses, funeral and burial expenses, [and] lost income.” Id.
98. Id. “These conditions are known as the tort liability threshold and may be expressed
in verbal terms such as death or significant disfigurement (verbal threshold) or in dollar amounts
of medical bills (monetary threshold).” Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. In these states, first-party coverage may not be mandatory, and benefits may be
less than no-fault states. Id.
103. Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6
CONN. INS. L.J. 11, 16 (1999).
104. Id. at 14.
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who also pay into the “scheme.”105 “Much of the collective nature of
insurance is disguised, or at least not readily obvious to the policyholders,
especially in private insurance.”106 The insurance holder pays into the
system with the intent to protect themselves, but until they need to collect
an insurance benefit, all of their payments go towards paying for other
insured drivers’ damages.107
Unlike insurance companies in the late nineteenth century, modern
insurance companies are so massive “that individuals rarely have any
face-to-face contact with managers and virtually never have any contact
with other policyholders.”108 In the tort-based system of automobile
insurance compensation, “[n]ot only is payment . . . often nonexistent or
a fraction of [the] true loss, but it is [often] long delayed.”109 In this
system, many victims, even those who are seriously injured, are not paid
at all from automobile insurance, or are paid only a small fraction of their
losses.110
The basic difficulty with the automobile insurance system is that it
turns on “legal liability” rather than just the occurrence of an injury during
an automobile accident.111 Automobile insurance is “particularly
conspicuous” when compared to other kinds of insurance, such as life
insurance or medical insurance, which are written by the same companies:
When you die, your life insurance company does not refuse to pay
your widow on the ground that you contributed to the unfortunate
result by smoking too many cigarettes or eating too much. When your
house burns down, your insurance company does not refuse to pay on
the ground that you should have had your roof reshingled with fireresistant materials. When you are hospitalized for a broken leg, your
health insurance company does not refuse payment on the ground that
if you had replaced the burned out bulb over your staircase, you would
[not] have fallen down the stairs. Yet, defenses parallel to these are
the common grist of automobile cases.112

Unlike other forms of insurance, automobile insurance companies
105. Id.
106. Id. at 16. The author argues “private insurers deliberately work to mask the
collective nature of the insurance enterprise in the way they market insurance and frame it in
public debates, because it is not in their interest to have policyholders unite as a collective
interest.” Id.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 17.
109. JEFFREY O’CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF NO-FAULT
INSURANCE, 6 (1971).
110. Id. at 4.
111. Id. at 3.
112. Id. at 3–4 (quoting Needed: A Basic Reform of Auto Liability Insurance, 406
CONSUMER REPORTS (Aug. 1962)).
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often deny coverage at first, or make it difficult for an injured party to
recover.113
“Private insurers market their policies chiefly by trying to induce a
sense of vulnerability in their target audiences. Therefore, much insurance
advertising portrays or just alludes to some kind of terrible harm that can
befall people.”114 In their advertisements, large insurance companies
portray “insurance [as] a helping institution,”115 making their audience
think that they “will be there when you need [them], and [that they are] a
reliable and effective place to turn for help.”116 While many individuals
have the expectation that when they are injured in an automobile accident
the insurance company of the person who caused the accident, or their
own insurance company, will compensate them, that is often not the
case.117 Rather,
[t]he result is not a system for paying people automobile insurance
after automobile accidents, but a system for fighting people about
paying them automobile accident insurance after automobile
accidents. The result is a system where the traffic victim—already
battered enough from the accident itself—cannot know after the
accident when he will be paid, what he will be paid[,] or if he will be
paid.118

The idea of “third-party” insurance, or liability insurance,119 establishes a
“public expectation of community aid.” That is, insurance that one party
carries for the express purpose of paying for injuries and losses that he or
she causes to others.120
C. Connecticut’s Approach to Automobile Insurance
Automobile insurance is one of the most frequently used types of
personal insurance in Connecticut.121 Any driver in Connecticut who
113. See id.
114. Stone, supra note 103, at 17.
115. Id. at 18, n. 20 (citing Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales
Stories, Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1403–07
(1994)).
116. Id. See, e.g., Allstate’s slogan is “you’re in good hands,” and often advertises
“mayhem is everywhere. An Allstate Agent can help protect you from mayhem.” Allstate,
Check Out Allstate’s Latest TV Commercials, https://www.allstate.com/advertising.aspx (last
visited Mar. 31, 2020); Nationwide advertises that their insurance “gives you peace of mind.”
NATIONWIDE, Auto Insurance, https://www.nationwide.com/personal/insurance/auto/ (last
visited Mar. 31, 2020).
117. Id.
118. JEFFREY O’CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF NO-FAULT
INSURANCE, 4 (Commerce Clearing House, Inc. ed. 1971).
119. See supra notes 66–71.
120. Stone, supra note 103, at 17. See supra Section II.A.
121. State of Conn. Ins. Dep’t, What is Auto Insurance?, CT.GOV,
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wants to receive a driver’s license, retain a driver’s license, or register a
motor vehicle must provide proof of, and continuously maintain, a
minimum amount of insurance,122 including liability coverage,123 as well
as uninsured and underinsured coverage.124 Connecticut follows the tort
liability approach to automobile insurance law.125 In this system, there are
no restrictions on lawsuits to recover damages, and the injured party can
recover damages after proving that the other party was liable for causing
the accident.126 From 1973 to 1993, Connecticut had a no-fault
automobile insurance system.127 The statute requiring no-fault automobile
insurance was repealed128 after much criticism, saying it led to higher
premiums and clogged courts.129 Now, “a person injured in an automobile
accident because of another’s negligent operation of a private passenger
motor vehicle can seek compensation for their injuries from the at-fault
driver, and, if necessary, initiate a personal injury lawsuit to determine
fault and the amount of damages to be awarded.”130 Under the terms of a
standard automobile insurance policy, an insurer has a duty to defend the
insured and has a right to recover any payments it makes to an insured
from those at fault.131
https://portal.ct.gov/CID/General-Consumer-Information/What-Is-Auto-Insurance
[https://perma.cc/2ECL-CEUR].
122. The minimum coverage that a driver insured in Connecticut must have is $25,000 in
coverage per person per accident for bodily injury liability, $50,000 in coverage per accident
for bodily injury liability, $25,000 in coverage per accident for property damage liability, and
Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist coverage of at least $25,000 per person/$50,000 per accident.
Id.
123. See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text.
124. LEDUC, supra note 64; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38a-336–43 (West
2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-371 (West 2017). Beginning in 1973, the Connecticut
Statute required all automobile insurance companies to provide uninsured and underinsured
motorist coverage. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-336 (West 2015).
125. See supra Section I.A; see also Background on: No-Fault Auto Insurance, INS. INFO.
INST., 3, 5–6 (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.iii.org/article/background-on-no-fault-auto-insurance
[https://perma.cc/3ACL-CPMT]. Since Connecticut has a tort liability approach “there are no
restrictions on lawsuits.” Id.
126. See supra Section I.B; JASPER, supra note 67, at 9; Background on: No-Fault Auto
Insurance, supra note 77.
127. LEDUC, supra note 64, at 1; see Background on: No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra
note 77.
128. Background on: No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 77.
129. Kirk Johnson, Senate Repeals No-Fault Insurance Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 1993),
https://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/08/nyregion/senate-repeals-no-fault-insurance-law.html
[https://perma.cc/B7A5-YF63]. See also CONSUMER WATCHDOG, A Failed Experiment:
Analysis and Evaluation of No-Fault Laws (last visited Aug. 2, 2020); NAT’L ASS’N INS.
COMM’R,
NO-FAULT
AUTO
INSURANCE:
A
SURVEY
(2000),
https://www.naic.org/documents/prod_serv_special_nfs_om.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5T8KTWTZ].
130. LEDUC, supra note 93.
131. Id.
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III. CONNECTICUT SHOULD DISALLOW INSURANCE COMPANIES
FROM BENEFITING FROM THE SUDDEN MEDICAL EMERGENCY
DEFENSE
Connecticut has a tort-based system to automobile insurance
claims,132 which means that in a legal claim, the defendant must be at fault
for the accident to be liable.133 The Sudden Medical Emergency Defense
confuses this idea, because it is often not contested that the defendant
violated a statute and caused the accident.134 While the defendant is
technically “at-fault” in such a scenario, courts have recognized that the
defendant could not foresee incapacitation, and therefore could not be held
to the legal standard of a “reasonable person would have exercised under
the circumstance[s].”135 So, while the courts agree that it is consistent
with public policy to allow the defendant to raise the Sudden Medical
Emergency Defense, because the defendant did not have any control over
the harm they caused, it is against public policy to allow insurance
companies to escape the responsibility of coverage solely because their
insured had a medical incapacitation. The purpose of liability insurance
is to provide coverage when the insured directly causes damages.136
This Note does not suggest that the Connecticut legislature reenact a
no-fault insurance system, that would “permit[] a person to recover
financial losses from his or her own insurance company regardless of who
caused the loss . . . .”137 Instead, this Note recommends that Connecticut
bar insurance companies from benefitting from the Sudden Medical
Emergency Defense at the expense of the innocently injured plaintiff.
This bar would allow a plaintiff in a case which involves a sudden medical
emergency defense to collect up to policy limits from the defendant’s
insurer, and underinsured or uninsured from their own insurer. This
solution can be accomplished through either a new statute passed by the
Connecticut legislature, or by a new regulation promulgated by the
Connecticut Insurance Department.
A. The Public Policy Interest Motivating This Change
In validating the Sudden Medical Emergency Defense, a California
court held that “as between an innocent injured party and an innocent ill
driver, the innocent injured party must suffer.”138 This assertion, however,
132. NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’R, supra note 129.
133. See discussion supra Section II.B; see also LEDUC, supra note 64, at 1.
134. See Anderson, supra note 22. The defendant conceded that they were the but-for
cause of the accident, but argues they owe no damages because they suffered a medical
emergency. Id.
135. Hesse v. McClintic, 176 P.3d 759, 761 (Colo. 2008).
136. See supra Section II.B.
137. LEDUC, supra note 130.
138. Bashi v. Wodarz, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 635, 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). See also supra
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fails to consider the other parties that are involved in the compensation
scheme of tort liability: the insurers of the parties. While the rationale in
support of the defense is correct: a person who becomes unforeseeably
incapacitated cannot be held to a reasonable person standard;139 the
defense has a harsh burden, that rests solely on the innocent injured
party,140 that many in society may not agree with. This is because even
though the defendant would not have the “harsh burden,” the plaintiff will
now be suffering the harsh consequences.141 After all, insurance is
designed to indemnify an insured against the risk of loss.142
One’s automobile insurance policy is governed by their insurance
contract,143 not by the subjective beliefs of when someone thinks their
insurance should cover a loss.144 It is a well-held rule in the United States
that a party is free to contract, as long as the contract does not violate any
statutory scheme or public policy.145 While contracts govern coverage,
public policy interests are also involved, as set forth in the statutes,
regulations, and judicial decisions.146 Even if a term in an insurance policy
is unambiguous, it will not be enforced if it violates public policy by
attempting to dilute, condition, or limit statutorily mandated insurance
coverage.147 An insurance contract violates public policy when it “so
obviously [goes] against the public health, safety, morals, or welfare.”148
In that circumstance the court “may constitute itself as the voice of the
community in so declaring that the contract is against public policy.”149
Courts are hesitant to invoke “public policy” to override the express
terms of an insurance policy; they will only do so in the clearest cases.150
However, courts are not the only entity that has the power to make a
decision based on public policy; constitutions and statutes are also created

note 34 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
140. Bashi, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639.
141. See generally id.
142. Sean W. Gallagher, The Public Policy Exclusion and Insurance for Intentional
Employment Discrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1256, 1265 (1994).
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. Gordon v. Musser, No. X04HHDCV106014879S, 2012 WL 1509798, at *3 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2012); Hill v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 249 P.3d 812, 816
(Idaho 2011) (quoting J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740, 741 (Ohio 2007)). “The ‘liberty of contract
is not an absolute and unlimited right, but upon the contrary is always subservient to the public
welfare.’” Id.
146. Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, L.L.C., 108 P.3d 332, 336 (Idaho 2005).
147. Robert E. Anderson et al., Basis of Public Policy, 43 AM. JUR. 2D INSURANCE § 276
(Feb. 2020).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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in line with public policy.151
The public policy of the state is reflected in its constitution, statutes,
and judicial decisions for purposes of determining whether the terms
of an insurance policy are contrary to public policy. It is said that
public policy invalidating a contract or insurance policy provision is
to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not
from general considerations of supposed public interest.152

Public policy interests persuading state legislators vary from state to
state.153 There have been statutes and regulations passed in Connecticut
with the purpose of protecting the insured.154 A statute that disallows
insurance companies from denying coverage because of a sudden medical
emergency would further this purpose.
B. The Legislative and Regulatory Mechanism to Bring About This
Change
Automobile insurance is provided to individuals by private
companies, but those companies must adhere to both statutes created by
the legislature, and regulations created by the Connecticut Insurance
Department.155 To protect law-abiding drivers who are injured by an
incapacitated driver, from bearing the high cost of damages alone,156
Connecticut should create a statute or regulation that requires insurance
companies to provide coverage if an accident is caused by a Sudden
Medical Emergency.
1. Change by Legislation
The Connecticut legislature should pass a statute implementing a rule
that requires every insurance company to provide liability coverage if their
insured would have been considered negligent but-for a Sudden Medical
Emergency. The interest behind this statute would be comparable to the

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Compare Hill v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 249 P.3d 812, 816 (Idaho
2011) (“Neither the Idaho legislature nor the courts have declared that there exists a public
policy applicable to underinsured motorist coverage.”), with Gormbard v. Zurich Ins. Co., 904
A.2d 198, 202 (Conn. 2006) (reasoning the statute mandating underinsured motorist coverage
was creating in the public policy interest that “every insured is entitled to recover for the
damages he or she would have been able to recover if the uninsured motorist had maintained a
policy of liability insurance.”).
154. See infra Section III.B.1.
155. STATE OF CONN. INS. DEP’T, Mission & Divisions, CT.GOV,
https://portal.ct.gov/CID/About-Us/Divisions [https://perma.cc/ZQ7K-SRP2]. Connecticut
General Statute 38a gives the Connecticut Insurance Department authority to regulate insurance.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a (West 2015).
156. Bashi v. Wodarz, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 635, 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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public policy interests behind the Connecticut legislative decision to
require every insurance policy in the state to include uninsured and
underinsured motorist coverage. It would show the legislature’s public
policy interest in protecting the insured and their willingness to create
legislation reflecting in that interest.157 In 1967, the legislature enacted
General Statutes section 38-175c,158 now codified at section 38a-336,159
which requires every insurance policy to include uninsured and
underinsured motorist coverage.160 This statutory mandate was enacted
for the public policy interest161 of providing protection to insured
persons.162 Uninsured and underinsured coverage is purchased to protect
the insured, not a third party who causes harm to the insured.163 It is
“wholly independent” of the tortfeasor.164
The insurer shall undertake to pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from
the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily
injury sustained by the insured caused by an accident involving the
uninsured [or underinsured] motor vehicle.165

The policy reasons behind underinsured and uninsured motorist coverage
echo the reasons why individuals purchase automobile insurance in the
first place: to pay into a system so they can receive coverage if they fall
victim to an automobile accident.166
157. Streitweiser v. Middlesex Mut. Assur. Co., 593 A.2d 498, 500–01 (Conn. 1991).
158. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-175c (West 1967).
159. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-336 (West 2015).
160. Gormbard v. Zurich Ins. Co., 904 A.2d 198, 202 (Conn. 2006).
161. Id. at 203. The public policy rational is the belief that “every insured is entitled to
recover for the damages he or she would have been able to recover if the uninsured motorist had
maintained a policy of liability insurance. Insurance companies are powerless to restrict the
broad coverage mandated by the statute.” Id.
162. See id. at 210.
163. Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 699 A.2d 964, 981 (1997).
164. Id.
[An][u]ninsured [or underinsured] motorist [payment] is not for the benefit of the
tortfeasor. The disposition of an uninsured [or underinsured] motorist claim
generally has no relation to or effect on the liability of the uninsured motorist (or
other joint tortfeasors). One reason for this is that in most states the insurer is
entitled to be subrogated to the insured’s tort claim against the uninsured [or
underinsured] motorist.
Thus, courts have repeatedly concluded that
ordinarily . . . the insurance payment does not diminish the damages that may be
recovered from an uninsured [or underinsured] tortfeasor or a joint tortfeasor who
is insured.
Id.
165. Gormbard v. Zurich Ins. Co., 904 A.2d 198, 203 (Conn. 2006) (citing Streitweiser
v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 593 A.2d 498, 501 (Conn. 1991)).
166. See supra Section II.B and accompanying text. Automobile insurance companies
market their product as being there for you when you have loss or when you cause loss to
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2. Change by Connecticut Insurance Department Regulation
The Connecticut Insurance Department enforces state insurance laws
and “ensures [that] policyholders are treated fairly.”167 Additionally,
Connecticut is part of the [United States] insurance regulatory framework
which is a highly coordinated state-based national system designed to
protect policyholders and to serve the greater public interest through the
effective regulation of the [United States] insurance marketplace.168
The Connecticut Insurance Department provides “regulatory
oversight to better protect the interests of consumers while ensuring a
strong, viable insurance marketplace.”169 This department creates
regulations, supplementing federal and state law, to ensure the insurance
industry is fair.170 For example, the Connecticut Insurance Department
has regulations regarding the minimum standards for insurance policies
issued in the state.171 Through their power, the Connecticut Insurance
Department should create a regulation requiring insurance companies to
provide coverage when a sudden medical emergency caused the accident.
C. How the Recommended Change Would Affect a Trial Involving a
Sudden Medical Emergency Defense
The majority of automobile accident cases settle before a trial.172 If
Connecticut enacted the statute or regulation addressed above, automobile
insurance companies in the state would be required to abide by the new
rule. Accordingly, instead of denying liability, insurance companies
would be more eager to settle with the injured plaintiffs because the
insurance companies would want to avoid the high costs of a trial.
If the case does not settle and goes to a jury trial, Connecticut has
procedural mechanisms that would assist in dividing liability between the
defendant and their insurance company.173 After both the defendant and
the plaintiff have presented their case, evidence has been submitted, and
any motions have been heard and disposed of, it is time to submit the case
to the jury.174 The process of submitting the case to the jury involves both
another. See also Gormbard, 904 A.2d at 203.
167. CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 38a-8-1 (1992); STATE OF CONN. INS. DEP’T, supra note
155.
168. STATE OF CONN. INS. DEP’T, supra note 155.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 38a-327-3 (1992).
172. Wood R. Foster, Jr., How Trial Lawyer Became an Oxymoron, 74 BENCH & B.
MINN. 16, 16 (2017).
173. See generally CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-224 (West 2019); Trial Practice:
Submission of the Case to the Jury, 6 CONN. PRAC., § 10.3, 2d ed. (updated Nov. 2019);
Interrogatories to the Jury, CONN. PRAC. BOOK § 16-18 (2019).
174. Trial Practice: Submission of the Case to the Jury, 6 CONN. PRAC., § 10.1, 2d ed.
(updated Nov. 2019).
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the judge and the jury.175 Before the jury deliberates, the judge gives the
“judge’s charge,”176 where the judge “instructs the jury about the relevant
laws that should guide its deliberations,”177 “define[s] any terms or words
that may not be familiar to the jurors,”178 and “advise[s] the jury that it is
the sole judge of the facts and of the credibility (believability) of
witnesses.”179
“Section 52–224 of the Connecticut General Statutes permits the use
of a ‘special verdict,’”180 while Connecticut Practice Book Section 16–18
authorizes the use of a general verdict with interrogatories.181
Accordingly, in Connecticut, trial courts have broad discretion as to
whether to use a special verdict or interrogatories with a general verdict.182
The special verdict procedure is used to allow the jury to make
decisions of fact, while avoiding prejudice and bias in doing so.183 It
accomplishes this by having the jury “answer each question according to
the evidence, regardless of the effect or supposed effect of the answer on
the rights of the parties as to recovery.”184 Then, the judge applies the law
to their individual findings of fact.185 While special verdicts are not
175. Id. The judge determines questions of law, while the jury determines questions of
fact. Id.
176. Id.
177. How Courts Work: Steps in a Trial, AM. B. ASS’N (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_netw
ork/how_courts_work/juryinstruct/ [https://perma.cc/9ZFG-BW47].
178. Id.
179. Id.; Trial Practice: Submission of the Case to the Jury, 6 CONN. PRAC., § 10.1, 2d
ed. (updated Nov. 2019). In Connecticut, attorneys are able to “request to charge,” meaning
they can request that the judge give certain statements of law to the jury. Id.
180. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-224 (West 2019); Robert B. Yules, Interrogatories to
the Jury, CONN. PRAC. BOOK § 16-18 (2019).
181. Trial Practice: Submission of the Case to the Jury, 6 CONN. PRAC., § 10.3, 2d ed.
(updated Nov. 2019).
Though they may to some extent both subserve the same purpose, there is still a
material difference between special verdicts and findings by responses to
interrogatories. By the former no unconditional general verdict is rendered, but
the jury find [] the facts and submit the question of law arising upon them to the
court . . . .By the latter, answers pertinent to, and perhaps controlling, although not
necessarily fully covering, an issue framed, are given, always in connection with
a general verdict . . . .The purpose of the former is to furnish the basis of a
judgment to be rendered, and of the latter, by eliciting a determination of material
facts, to furnish the means of testing the correctness of the verdict rendered, and
of ascertaining its extent . . . .
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. The jury makes the determination of evidential facts, rather than ultimate facts,
and then the judge applies the law and directs entry for a verdict. Trial Practice: Submission of
the Case to the Jury, 6 CONN. PRAC., § 10.4, 2d ed. (updated Nov. 2019).
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frequently used by Connecticut courts,186 general verdicts with
interrogatories have long been an accepted practice and are becoming
much more common.187 “The trial court is vested with wide discretion to
submit interrogatories to the jury for the purpose of ascertaining the jury’s
decision on contested issues.”188 Interrogatories are used to elicit certain
factual information from the jury, so the court can make a determination
of law.189
Special verdicts and interrogatories for the jury provide the
procedural mechanism needed for dealing with the proposed legislation.
In automobile accident liability cases, the jury is prohibited from taking
into account automobile coverage when deciding their verdict.190 When
deciding the case, the jury is provided evidence relating to the defendant
driver and innocent plaintiff, but the insurance company is not one of the
named parties in the case. So, while the legislation would still allow a
defendant to use a Sudden Medical Emergency Defense, their insurance
company and the plaintiff’s insurance company would not be able to
benefit from the defense. Instead, the court would provide the jurors with
interrogatories, eliciting factual findings of whether the defendant violated
a statute, and whether the jury found facts supporting the finding that a
sudden medical emergency existed. Then, after receiving the answers of
the jurors, the court can apply the law. If the jury found factually that the
defendant was not liable because of the defense, the court can legally
impose a duty on the insurance company to pay damages, up to the policy
limits.
CONCLUSION
When a defendant asserts a Sudden Medical Emergency Defense in a
motor vehicle accident negligence claim, it becomes more difficult for a
plaintiff to prove that the defendant was negligent or “legally liable.” In
these cases, there are often no factual contentions over whether the
defendant violated a statute.191 Rather, the factual question for the jury is
whether a sudden medical emergency was the direct cause of the accident,
and if that excuses the defendant from legal liability.192 However, the
186. Trial Practice: Submission of the Case to the Jury, 6 CONN. PRAC., § 11.4, 2d ed.
(updated Nov. 2019).
187. Id.
188. Trial Practice: Submission of the Case to the Jury, 6 CONN. PRAC., § 10.3, 2d ed.
(updated Nov. 2019).
189. Id.
190. JUDGE SUPPORT SERVICES, CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL BRANCH CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
2.9-2
(Oct.
1,
2018),
https://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/Civil/Civil.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9P6C-QC8Y].
191. See Roman v. Estate of Gobbo, 791 N.E.2d 422, 423–24 (Ohio 2003) (the parties
agreed to the facts that the driver was accelerating and swerving about the road).
192. See supra notes 23–32 and accompanying text. Roman, 791 N.E.2d at 423–24 (Ohio
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defendant is not the only party escaping liability through this defense;193
since a Sudden Medical Emergency Defense is often a complete defense
in an automobile accident trial, the injured innocent plaintiff is left with
little to no recovery from the defendant, the defendant’s insurance
company, or their own insurance company.
Many jurisdictions have discussed the sudden emergency doctrine but
have decided to follow case law precedent in upholding a complete
defense.194 Connecticut has enacted legislation to protect an innocent
plaintiff against an uninsured or underinsured motorist if that motorist is
found to be a tortfeasor.195 The creation of the underinsured motorist
statute was strongly based on public policy considerations.196 For the
same public policy reasons, Connecticut should enact a statute or
regulation to disallow automobile insurance companies from benefitting
from the Sudden Medical Emergency Defense. Unlike jurisdictions that
have overturned the defense completely, this change would not shift the
losses from the innocent plaintiff to the incapacitated driver. Rather, this
change in Connecticut would protect both the innocent plaintiff and the
incapacitated driver, while requiring the insurance company to pay the
policy limits. This limited statute or regulation would ensure that
insurances companies do what they advertise: protect the insured when
another causes an automobile accident.

2003). Instead of a factual question, at trial, the issue was solely about liability and whether the
heart attack the driver suffered made him not responsible and not negligent. Id.
193. See supra Section I.A.
194. See supra Section I.A and Section I.D.
195. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-336 (West 2015). See supra Section II.A and
Section II.C.
196. See Gormbard v. Zurich Ins. Co., 904 A.2d 198, 203 (Conn. 2006).

